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On the fallibility of 
simulation models in 
informing pandemic 
responses
As of April 24, 2020, the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 
(SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has led to 
over 2·7 million confirmed cases, and 
190 000 reported deaths worldwide. To 
reduce the transmission and mortality 
of this newly emerging infection, 
countries have needed to make rapid 
policy decisions on the basis of scarce 
early data with many uncertainties.
In the early stages of pandemics, 
mathematical models can provide 
valuable insights into transmission 
dynamics, help to predict disease 
spread, and evaluate control 
measures.1 However, models are 
only valid within the limits of the 
parameters examined. As reliable 
parameter estimates are rarely 
available early in a new pandemic, 
best-guess estimates are used, 
which need to be constantly 
reviewed as new real-world data 
emerge. Estimating how sensitive the 
model is to changes in its parameters 
can provide useful information 
about validity when parameters 
are uncertain. Interpreting models 
without considering these factors can 
lead to flawed inferences, which can 
have far-reaching effects when they 
inform public health policy.
We illustrate the potential impact 
that flawed model inferences can have 
on public health policy with the model 
described in The Lancet Global Health 
by Joel Hellewell and colleagues,2 
which is part of the scientific evidence 
informing the UK Government’s 
response to coronavirus disease 2019 
(COVID-19).3 On March 12, 2020, 
the UK Government decided to cease 
community testing and contact 
tracing, claiming that the scientific 
evidence did not support these 
strategies, as the UK had entered the 
so-called delay phase of the epidemic. 
These actions were consistent with 
the conclusions of Hellewell and 
colleagues that these measures 
were unlikely to be able to bring the 
epidemic under control in under 
12 weeks: “In most plausible outbreak 
scenarios, case isolation and contact 
tracing alone is insufficient to control 
outbreaks, and in some scenarios even 
near perfect contact tracing will still be 
insufficient, and further interventions 
would be required to achieve control.”2
A key parameter of the model 
was the delay between a case 
becoming symptomatic and being 
isolated.2 Two median delays were 
modelled—3·83 days (short) and 
8·09 days (long)—on the basis of data 
from the SARS-CoV epidemic, and 
an empirical distribution calculated 
from the early phase of the SARS-
CoV-2 outbreak in Wuhan.2 However, 
by this time, several rapid tests with 
a turnaround time of less than 4 h 
had been developed internationally, 
with some having received relevant 
regulatory approvals.4 Soon after, 
South Korea and Singapore began 
drive- through testing and had 
developed the capacity to test rapidly 
and deliver results within a single 
day, making a 1-day delay scenario 
plausible.5,6 Indeed, recent models 
examining interventions for COVID-19 
control in Singapore have assumed a 
1-day delay between symptom onset 
and quarantine.7
We find that inferences of the model 
from Hellewell and colleagues2 are 
very sensitive to the parameter of 
onset-to-isolation delay (appendix). 
Using the authors’ original code, we 
demonstrate that when the delay 
is changed to a median of 1 day, 
the model predicts the probability 
of controlling the epidemic within 
12 weeks to be more than 80%, with 
30–60% (ie, considerably less than near 
perfect) contact tracing (depending on 
the proportion of pre-symptomatic 
cases at a given time). These results 
suggest that rapid testing, contact 
tracing, and isolation could be 
effective strategies to control 
transmission.
At the time that the UK Government 
decided to cease community testing, 
real-world data from several other 
countries were pointing to the 
effectiveness of testing and contact 
tracing, potentially at odds with 
the evidence that the government 
was following. On March 12, 2020 
(16 days after the tenth SARS-CoV-2 
death in both South Korea and 
Italy), South Korea had 66 reported 
deaths compared with Italy’s 827 
(appendix). The epidemic trajectories 
in South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and 
Singapore have been vastly different 
from most European countries, with 
far fewer deaths (appendix). Although 
multiple aspects of the populations 
and systems of these countries 
could have contributed to these 
differences, one key commonality is 
the early adoption of an approach 
focused on testing, isolation, and 
contact tracing in the countries with 
slower trajectories. Indeed, many 
of these countries did not institute 
nationwide lockdown measures at 
all or until much later, after the curve 
had flattened, potentially indicating 
the impact of case detection-based 
strategies on transmission (appendix). 
These detection-based strategies 
might have allowed the countries 
to control transmission without 
stringent lockdown measures and 
school closures, thus avoiding the 
disruption that these entail. Instead, 
they were able to implement targeted 
restrictions in response to observed 
outbreaks (eg, church closures in South 
Korea).8 By contrast, many European 
countries have had to impose 
lockdowns much earlier in the timeline 
of their epidemics (appendix).
Empirical, real-world data must be 
considered alongside mathematical 
models when devising pandemic 
responses. Models are fallible and 
scientists and policy makers must 
be mindful that an over-reliance 
on models, and a lack of caution in 
interpreting them, could be a costly 
exercise.
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For the original code for the 
model from Hellewell and 
colleagues see https://github.
com/cmmid/ringbp
For the code for the modified 
model see https://github.com/
dgurdasani1/covid_sim/blob/
master/generate_results_dg.R
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